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Noise and imperfection of realistic devices are major obstacles for implementing quantum cryp-
tography. In particular, birefringence in optical fibres leads to decoherence of qubits encoded in
photon polarization. We show how to overcome this problem by doing single qubit quantum com-
munication without a shared spatial reference frame and precise timing. Quantum information will
be encoded in pairs of photons using “tag” operations which corresponds to the time delay of one of
the polarization modes. This method is robust against the phase instability of the interferometers
despite the use of time-bins. Moreover synchronized clocks are not required in the ideal no photon
loss case as they are only necessary to label the different encoded qubits.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Pp, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
Quantum mechanics allows the distribution of cryp-
tographic keys whose security is based on the laws of
physics instead of the difficulty of solving mathematical
problems [1, 2]. Turning this idea into practical tech-
nologies brings exciting challenges. The first prototype
for quantum cryptography was built more than ten years
ago over a distance of 30 cm in free space [3] and used
the photons’ polarization as qubits of information. Since,
many quantum key distribution (QKD) experiments have
been realized through air and optic fibres [4]. One of the
obstacles to improve the fibre based prototypes is the
birefringence effects due to geometric asymmetries and
tension fluctuations which are a major impediment for
polarization based-coding experiments [5]. When the co-
herence time of the photon is large compared to the delay
caused by polarization mode dispersion, the birefringence
can be represented by a time dependent unitary trans-
formation U(t) that acts on the polarization space. The
time dependance comes from the mechanical variations
in the fibre over time and its rate varies with the envi-
ronmental conditions.
A possible solution to this problem is the application of
active feedback [6]. Tomography on some predetermined
polarization states could be used to approximate U for a
certain time interval [7, 8]. By applying his approxima-
tion of U † before his measurements, Bob (the receiver)
could recover the states sent by Alice (the sender). How-
ever, this technique is practical only if the rate of change
of U is relatively low. For this reason, the most successful
QKD experiments were not based on polarization coding,
such as the phase based experiment proposed by Bennett
et al. using unbalanced interferometer [9, 10, 11]. How-
ever, a good control of the polarization modes is nec-
essary to obtain a better visibility since some compo-
nents like phase modulators are polarization dependent
and the temperature of the interferometers must be stabi-
lized since very small fluctuations between the two arms
cause phase shifts that corrupt the quantum states.
Another very important example of a successful QKD
protocol is the plug-and-play set-up [12, 13]. Using a
Faraday mirror [14], the photons sent by Bob are re-
flected back in the fibre by Alice, who in turn encodes
information in their phase. By travelling back in the fi-
bre, the birefringence is reversed and, as it can be shown,
the polarization state received by Bob are orthogonal to
the original one. Since Bob controls the polarization state
of the photon, he can make use of a polarized beamsplit-
ter which increases the interference visibility. Although
the plug-and-play set-up has very interesting character-
istics, it is not compatible with a non-Poissonian source
which could get rid of the multi-photons per pulse prob-
lem. Another disadvantage is that the use of two-way
quantum cryptography is more vulnerable to a certain
kind of eavesdropping strategy: the Trojan attack. An
eavesdropper (i.e. Eve) could send photons in Alice’s lab,
catch them after they were reflected by the Faraday mir-
ror and get some information about Alice’s set-up with-
out being detected.
To circumvent the threat of the Trojan attack and
the instability of the interferometers, Walton et al. [15]
proposed a one-way protocol based on decoherence free-
subspaces in which each qubit is encoded in the time and
phase of a pair of photons. In this Letter, we propose a
new way to protect qubits encoded in polarization states
of a photon pair from birefringence effects in optical fibre.
The idea is to take advantage of the fact that bire-
fringence can be well approximated by a collective er-
ror model as long as the photons travel inside a time
window small compared to the variation of the birefrin-
gence. Thus, if the effect of birefringence on one photon
is U(t), on n photons it is U(t)⊗n. This latter operator
can be interpreted as a rotation of the reference frame
axis and our protocol reduces to the problem of develop-
ing a strategy to do quantum communication without a
shared reference frame.
In a recent paper [16], Bartlett et al. showed it should
be possible to “communicate with perfect fidelity with-
out a shared reference frame at a rate that asymptotically
approaches one encoded qubit per transmitted qubit.” In
particular, they proposed a method to encode a qubit
using four photons in a decoherence-free-subspace of the
collective noise model. However this required having full
control of the states of qubits. This is out of reach of
today’s technology. More recently, two realistic QKD
2protocols that do not require any shared reference frame
have been proposed [17]. These protocols do not require
a general state of a qubit but only a set of non-orthogonal
states. It encodes qubits in both three and four photon
states, which makes the protocol more sensitive to pho-
ton loss. For these reasons, we will describe a two photon
protocol robust against phase instability of the interfer-
ometer without the need for a shared spatial reference
frame or synchronized clocks. If we neglect dispersion
and discard relativistic situations then we are close to
having no need for a shared reference frame at all.1
To explain our protocol we need to introduce the “tag”
operation Ti which delay the photons in the state |i〉 by a
specific amount of time. Experimentally it can be imple-
mented using a polarized beamsplitter to separate polar-
ization modes in arms of different length before recombi-
nation in the same optical path.
Suppose Alice inputs a two-photon state of the form
α|HV 〉+ β|V H〉 where H and V correspond to the hor-
izontal and vertical polarization state of a photon. The
time delay between the two photons ∆tp, must be fixed
by Alice and known by Bob. It must be large enough such
that Bob’s apparatus can differentiate between the two
photons and that “tag” operation will never change their
order of arrival. If Alice applies the “tag” operation TV
on the initial state then she will have α|HVT 〉+β|VTH〉,
where subscript T denotes the delay. Suppose some col-
lective noise U⊗2 (that includes a change of reference
frame) is applied to this state when it travels to Bob and
suppose also that Bob applies the “tag” operation TH′
when he receives it. Up to a global phase, the state is
then mapped to
α
2
(|H ′TV
′
T 〉 − |V
′H ′TT 〉+ δ1(|H
′
TV
′
T 〉+ |V
′H ′TT 〉)
+δ2(|H
′
TH
′
TT 〉+ |V
′V ′T 〉) + δ3(|H
′
TH
′
TT 〉 − |V
′V ′T 〉))
+
β
2
(|V ′TH
′
T 〉 − |H
′
TT 1
′〉+ δ1(|V ′TH
′
T 〉+ |H
′
TT 1
′〉) (1)
+δ2(|H
′
TTH
′
T 〉+ |V
′
TV
′〉) + δ3(|H ′TTH
′
T 〉 − |V
′
TV
′〉))
where |H ′〉 and |V ′〉 notation is used since the state is
now defined in Bob’s reference frame. We used the fact
that the anti-symmetric state |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉)
is invariant under collective noise and that |Ψ+〉 =
1√
2
(|HV 〉 + |V H〉) will be mapped to a superposition
of the triplet Bell states for which the δ’s represent
the relative weights and phases and follow the equality
||δ1||
2 + ||δ2||
2 + ||δ3||
2 = 1. For later convenience, we
define |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|HH〉 ± |V V 〉) and we will drop the
apostrophe notation for simplicity.
The last operation is to project onto the states sub-
space in which the photons are separated in time by
exactly ∆tp, i.e. both have been subjected to one tag
1 For reasons we will explain later, Bob needs to know the relative
rate of time flow in Alice’s reference frame.
operation. This operation does not require synchronized
clocks, since Bob just needs to compare the arrival time
of both photons. If the interval of time between a pair of
photons is not ∆tp, then he discards these qubits, which
happens 1 − || (1+δ1)2 ||
2 of the time if we neglect pho-
ton loss. Otherwise, Bob will obtain Alice’s initial state
α|HTVT 〉 + β|VTHT 〉 with certainty. As it could have
been showed using simple calculations, the final result is
independent of the phase coherence instability between
both arms of the interferometer in a way similar to the
qubits encoded in the Walton et al. protocol [15].
To check if the communication is efficient, || (1+δ1)2 ||
2
must be estimated. If the collective noise is aver-
aged uniformly2 over all possible values of U(t)⊗2, then
〈|| (1+δ1)2 ||
2〉 = 13 , which means Bob will obtain Alice’s
state with a probability of 13 . Yet, this result supposes
that the unitary matrix U will average uniformly over all
possible values during the communication time. To make
the protocol independent of the environment, Bob could
apply a random unitary matrix B⊗2 on the photon po-
larization states just before making his “tag” operation3.
An improved version of the scheme exploiting some
partial knowledge of the shared reference frame to mod-
ify the transformation B to approximate the transforma-
tion U †(t) would increased the ratio of useful encoded
qubits. Depending on the efficiency of the active feed-
back mechanism and the rate of change of U(t), the ratio
could converge to 1.
FIG. 1: After receiving the two photons and applying his “tag”
operation, Bob can use this circuit to measure the qubit α|HV 〉 +
β|V H〉 in any basis by adjusting the gate M with a success proba-
bility of at least 1
8
. We refer to the text for more details.
To measure the qubit in a particular basis, Bob could
use a normal symmetric beamsplitter and consider the re-
sult when each photon goes through a different branch,
as shown in figure 1. Define p such that p = 0 if the
2 We assume that the randomness of the birefringence is such that
the distribution of U over a large amount of time is uniform.
The Haar measure over the space of unitary matrices is then
used to calculate the average 〈〈ψ|T †1U
⊗2T1|ψ〉〉 which equals
1
3
independently of |ψ〉. Consequently, 〈||
(1+δ1)
2
||2〉 = 1
3
.
3 The distribution of the operator B should correspond to the nor-
malized Haar measure. Experimentally, B could be implemented
with Pockels cells the same way as Franson and Jacobs in their
1995 experiment [6].
3first photon goes through branch b1 and 1 if it is the sec-
ond photon. Remark that the two photons arrive at the
beamsplitter at different times and that Bob can differ-
entiate them. At the end of branch b1, Bob measures in
his diagonal {|+〉, |−〉} polarization basis. Define k such
that k = 0 if the outcome is |+〉 and 1 if it is |−〉. The
photon on the other branch b2 must then be in the state
XpZk(α|H〉+β|V 〉) where X and Z are the corresponding
Pauli operators. Using Pockels cells (M) on the second
branch and a polarized beam splitter, Bob can measure
the qubit in any specific basis with a chance of success re-
duced by a factor of at most 8, since at the very least the
measurement is successful when each photon exits from
a different branch and p=k=0. Measurement in some
bases will be successful more often than others.
We have described a technique to encode a robust qubit
against collective noise and to measure it in any basis.
We now show how this could be useful for a realistic QKD
implementation. First, we describe the well known QKD
protocol BB84 [2]. This protocol uses a set of four quan-
tum states consisting of two maximally conjugate basis
states |0〉, |1〉 and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Alice randomly
chooses which basis she will use to encode qubits to send
Bob, who, upon arrival of a qubit, also chooses at random
in which of the two basis he will perform a measurement.
After repeating the protocol for a string of random bits,
they publicly share what basis they used for each qubit.
The bits for which they have used the same basis is used
to build the sifted key. Since Eve has no prior knowledge
of which basis Alice and Bob will use, any attempt of
eavesdropping will disturb the states and induce errors
in the sifted key with high probability. A portion of the
sifted key is used to detect possible eavesdropping. If
the error rate is lower than some given threshold, the left
over bits will be transformed to the final secret key by
using error correction and privacy amplification [18].
To implement a protocol similar to BB84, Alice needs
to encode the states |HVT 〉, |VTH〉,
1√
2
(|HVT 〉+ |VTH〉)
and 1√
2
(|HVT 〉 − |VTH〉) using parametric down conver-
sions, filters and polarized beamsplitters as shown in fig-
ure 2. We have to note that the measurement procedure
described earlier works only if the state received by Bob
after post-selection was of the form γ1|HV 〉 + γ2|V H〉
where γi ∈ C respecting a normalizing condition. This
condition may no longer be true if sources of noise other
than collective noise are considered or if we suppose
that Eve altered the state sent to Bob. In the lat-
ter case, Bob’s state after post-selection would look like
γ1|HV 〉 + γ2|V H〉 + γ3|V V 〉 + γ4|HH〉. To implement
the provenly secure BB84 protocol, Bob must be able
to project that state into the subspace in which Alice
has encoded her space i.e. the space spanned by |HV 〉
and |V H〉. If Bob wants to measure in the computa-
tional basis ({|V H〉, |HV 〉}), then immediately after his
“tag” operation he simply needs to measure the |H〉 or
|V 〉 polarization of each photon. In this case, he will
also distinguish and be able to discard the states |HH〉
and |V V 〉. The measurement in the diagonal basis |Ψ±〉
is not as straight forward. Suppose Bob applies an ex-
tra Hadamard gate on both photons before measuring
the polarization states. If γ3 = γ4 = 0, then he mea-
sures |Ψ+〉 if both photons have the same polarization
and |Ψ−〉 if they have different polarization. In general,
γ3 = γ4 6= 0, but the uniformly distributed random ro-
tation B performed by Bob (unknown to Eve) when he
received the state will destroy any phase coherence be-
tween the states γ1|HV 〉+γ2|V H〉, |HH〉 and |V V 〉 from
Eve’s perspective. Intuitively, this means if Eve used the
space spanned by {|V V 〉, |HH〉} it would be the same as
if she randomly sent one of |Ψ−〉 or |Ψ+〉 to Bob, giving
her no advantage. The complexity of the QKD security
proof which includes coherent attacks restrains our argu-
ment, but the authors conjuncture that our protocol is
unconditionally secure with the same error threshold as
BB84. As a last remark, we note that only the qubits
that have survived the post-selection are used to build
the sifted key to estimate the error rate and construct
the final secret key.
Earlier we discussed the possibility of using a feed-
back mechanism to increase the success rate of the post-
selection. It could also be used in the QKD imple-
mentation discussion above, but Bob must be careful
with whatever mechanism he uses since he must ensure
the phase coherence between the three states γ1|HV 〉 +
γ2|V H〉, |HH〉 and |V V 〉 be lost from Eve’s perspective.
A final random phase gate would be enough since it does
not affect the success probability of the post selection,
but will destroy the coherence between these states.
The advantages of our protocol over the plug -and-play
one are that this protocol is one-way, so there is no need
to be as worried with the Trojan attack. Moreover, it
does not require interferometer stability like in the Wal-
ton et al. protocol (by using decoherence-free subspace).
Although our protocol has similarities to the latter pro-
tocol, it is distinct for the following reasons:
First, synchronized clocks are necessary in our protocol
only to label the different photon pairs. In the Walton
et al. protocol, Bob must be able to distinguish between
photons that have been delayed once, twice and not at all.
Our protocol just needs to compare the delay between the
two photons and not their particular time of arrival. Con-
sequently, it requires a much smaller order of timing pre-
cision. For example, parametric down-conversion sources
with long pulse length no longer induce errors caused
by uncertainty in the emission time since both photons
are always created simultaneously. Remark that if the
number of events in which simultaneous dark counts on
different detectors occur is negligible, extra timing pre-
cision would not help Alice and Bob to reduce the noise
caused by the detector’s dark counts and is therefore not
necessary to our protocol.
Second, in the Walton et al. protocol, there is a 14
chance, independent of the birefringence, that the pho-
tons will be measured in the phase basis and a 34 chance
of measuring in the time basis. However, the optimal ef-
4FIG. 2: Implementation of a modified version of BB84 protocol based on qubits robust against collective noise. Quantum states are
generated through parametric down converters (PDC) supplemented by filters (F) and phase shifter (P). Alice and Bob do their “tag”
operation using polarized beamsplitters (PBS). The B operator is randomized uniformly or determined by using a smart feedback mech-
anism. Bob measure the state in the computational or the diagonal basis depending if he applied the identity (x = 0) or the Hadamard
gate (x = 1).
ficiency for the ideal implementation of BB84 is a prob-
ability of measurement equal to 12 in each basis. For
this reason, Walton et al. indicate that the intrinsic ef-
ficiency of their scheme was 14 . In the case where B is
chosen from a uniform distribution, our protocol would
have an intrinsic efficiency ratio of 16 since only a third of
the photon pairs is not discarded. However, depending
on the feedback mechanism, the intrinsic efficiency ratio
could be higher than 16 , up to
1
2 .
Third, the final state Bob uses is encoded in polar-
ization, not in time and phase. A good control of the
polarization states allows Bob to get ride of the noise
caused by the polarization dependance of some experi-
mental components, like phase modulators.
In this paper, we have given a realistic robust scheme to
do single qubit communication using two-photon states
per encoded qubit. This technique goes around the prob-
lem of birefringence in optical fibre, the requirement of
high precision synchronized timing and also the interfer-
ometer phase coherence instability. The protocol could
be slightly modified to exploit partial information about
a spatial reference frame to increase the bit rate by using
active feedback. We also explained how to implement
a slightly modified version of BB84 using the previously
mentioned methods.
We would like to conclude with some problems that
could make an experimental implementation of our
schemes more difficult. Depolarization could be a seri-
ous distance limitation for our protocol, forcing us to
use sources with longer coherence times [4]. To prevent
chromatic dispersion from affecting the time delays be-
tween the photons, the average wavelength of the pho-
tons should be chosen according to the zero chromatic
dispersion of the optical fiber [4, 19]. Finally, since our
protocol encoded each qubit with two photons, attenua-
tion and detector’s inefficiencies have a more significant
affect on its efficiency compared to one-photon proto-
cols. Nevertheless our proposal is in reach of experimen-
tal implementation and provides an elegant solution to
the problem of birefringence in optical fibres.
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